

ORIGIN/ACTION

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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
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OSD	USIA	NSA
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FBI	NIC	NSC
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AIRGRAM

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TO : Department of State

INFO: DOD

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FROM : Amembassy GUATEMALA

SUBJECT: INTERNAL SECURITY - MONTHLY REPORT - JUNE

REF :

I. SUMMARY

The month was fairly inactive from the internal security viewpoint and the situation at month's end was essentially unchanged from a month ago. The guerrillas are still on the defensive, short of both money and supplies, and reported to be going through a wound licking and reorganization phase. The government is confident and on the offensive and is dealing the insurgents telling blows, either directly or through its para military groups such as the commando squads in the capital, or the armed civilians in the countryside.

2. There is some concern that the "counter terror" tactics of the security forces' commando squads in the capital and the armed civilians in the countryside, particularly around Zacapa, might be getting out of hand and threatening to cause more problems than they are solving, but the situation appears to still be well under control.

II. ACTIVITY DURING MONTH

3. The activity on both the right and the left fell off during the month from 44 incidents in May to only 32 for June. The number of assassinated bodies found throughout the country also dropped from 27 to 18 (see Enclosure 1). There is no doubt that some of the incidents included above were non-political but these would account for a minority.

Enclosure: 1. Graph of terrorist activity during month

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY: DATE: 8/1/67
PORTIONS DENIED AS INDICATED

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4. The incidents there ~~xxxx~~^{were} did not depart significantly from the pattern of the previous month. Bombings were a bit more numerous and some received considerable attention and some shoot-ups in the capital were of more than routine interest.

5. Principal incidents during the month were:
who

- a. Police were guarding house of Vice-Minister of Government, Augusto CASTENEDA Morgan, killed June 2 as house was machine-gunned from passing car. He was one-time PGT member and had been active in the Arbenz government.
- b. House of Francisco VILLAGRAN Kramer, leader of leftist URD party was machinegunned same day.
- c. Five houses were bombed in the capital June 7 including those of well-known rightist leaders Mario SANDOVAL Alarcon, Jorge SAMAYOA Tac, and Roberto ALEJOS. [REDACTED] B1 EC
- d. Press of June 14 reported five guerrillas killed in gun fight in Zone 6 of capital. [REDACTED] B1 EC
- e. Press reported National Police killed Arnaldo VASQUEZ Rivera, head of FAR urban resistance movement, in gun fight June 24. [REDACTED] B1 EC

III. PSYCHOLOGICAL

6. The right, the left, and the government all contributed to the flow of propaganda during the month. The right was the most prolific group and churned out a number of flyers signed variously NOA, CADEG, MANO, etc., and, as usual, replete with more black lists. A NOA flyer threatened 27 well-known people who were accused of helping the FAR; a list signed CADEG threatened 21 including 3 deans of the University of San Carlos, and a list allegedly from the MANO threatened the defeated FRU (leftist) slate for offices in the Law School Students Association at San Carlos.

7. As the parade of these black lists lengthens, their influence and their effect on the public appears to diminish presumably largely because the people who thus make their way into print do not seem to be the object of noticeably more terrorist attacks than the general public so people are not as frightened of being named as they were at the beginning.

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8. The literature from the left has dwindled considerably and is markedly less in evidence ^{which} than that of the right. One item, however, is the monthly FAR bulletin, devoted a lead article to the theme "Yes, the FAR still does exist." Morale must have slipped to a pretty low point to make such an article useful.

9. The Government, too, provided its share of propaganda during the month, most of it in connection with the celebration of the first anniversary of the Méndez inauguration. The tone was set by the President in a speech to the congress on June 15. In a short optimistic statement he noted that the insurgents had been "practically routed." He scored the rightist extremists, however, who he accused of creating what he termed "bandit gangs." He called political stability his primary goal, reiterated his pledge to pacify the country during 1967, and said he planned to be the third chief of state in Guatemala's 150 years of independence to finish his term in office.

10. Defense Minister Col. Rafael ARRIAGA Bosque also made a major statement. In a speech on June 30 he dwelt on the theme of Army loyalty to the constitutional government and to the democratic process and ~~re~~ crossed the Army's decision to combat extremists of both the right as well as the left. In a particularly unequivocal statement he made a "solemn promise" not to "deviate from the path of absolute loyalty (to the government) nor (to) allow any change in political direction which would lead toward establishment of totalitarian regimes of any stripe." He denied categorically that there was any relationship between the Army and right-wing clandestine organizations and claimed they would be repressed as would those on the left. Reaffirmation of the military's support for President Méndez and his disassociation of the Army from the right wing terrorist groups may give pause to the diehard coup plotters such as the MLN group who habitually try to involve the military in their scenes.

IV. SECURITY FORCES

11. The police in the capital continued to put pressure on the guerrillas. Such actions as the raids on FAR safe houses, the death of urban terrorist leader Vasquez Rivera and others and the capture and interrogation of a number of guerrillas has kept them very much on the defensive.



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V. THE RIGHT

13. One problem which has been intensifying in recent weeks concerns the armed civilians, mostly in the Izabal/Zacapa region. They were armed and organized to help combat the guerrillas and all indications are that they were highly effective. But now that this initial job has been completed, it looks as if they might not simply fade away.

14. The problem is intensified by the fact that most of those armed were drawn largely, if not exclusively, from the ranks of the "Liberacionistas" (MLN Supporters). This was probably because they were considered the only group who could be counted on to make an all out anti-communist effort. Considering their background, however, it should not be surprising that while they undertook the eradication of the communists as their primary function, they undertook on the side to strike out at other elements they considered to be significantly to the left of themselves. There have been reports that these irregulars have not been particularly discriminating in their choice of targets. Perhaps the most disturbing reports, which are becoming more persistent, concern actions by these groups against the local rerepresentatives of the PR. PR workers and officials in some areas, notably around Zacapa fear for their lives and unless the situation changes considerably the PR will have a real problem finding a candidate in some municipal elections.

15. The above should not be interpreted to suggest that the group of armed irregulars constitute any real threat to the government. They do not. But because they are not well organized or disciplined (the Army has at best nominal control over their actions) individuals or groups of these armed civilians could engage in irresponsible activity which could at best embarrass the government. Also, since these groups are drawn almost exclusively from the ranks of the far right they constitute a source of support on which any extreme right politicians could rely in the event of a take-over attempt. And although the Embassy considers that any such attempt in the foreseeable future would be doomed to failure, the existence of such armed supporters might tend to give the potential plotters the courage to make a try.

VI. INSURGENTS

16. The guerrillas were quiet and are reported to be in a period of reevaluation and regrouping. They are reported to be short of arms and money and to be suffering low morale.

17. There is still considerable friction between the FAR and the PGT but the battle appears still to be drawn along the familiar lines.

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The old guard of the PGT continues to resist the FAR's attempts to take over the leadership with a group of "Red Guards." It is possible that the outcome of the LASO meeting will have an important bearing on the outcome of this internal struggle. If the FAR could elicit substantial support for their cause at the meeting, particularly tangible support from Cuba, it could be the death knell for the old guard of the PGT.

18. The rumors of the new FAR operations centers and training camps still abound but there is still no concrete information on this subject.

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
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Enclosure 1

FREQUENCY OF TERRORIST ACTIONS



Solid line is weekly figure.
Dotted line is weekly average figure for each month.

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